

APPPC RSPM

Guidelines for Protection against South American
Leaf Blight of Rubber

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Guidelines for Protection against South American Leaf Blight of Rubber

INTRODUCTION

Scope

This standard provides guidelines for members of the APPPC, particularly rubber growing countries, to assist them to improve or develop their phytosanitary measures, including prevention, eradication and control, against South American leaf blight of rubber (SALB). It covers all the areas of plant health dealing with the protection of member countries rubber industries from SALB.

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Definitions and abbreviations

Except where noted, the definitions are from ISPM No. 5, *Glossary of phytosanitary terms*.

Control (of a pest) - Suppression, containment or eradication of a pest population [FAO, 1995]

devitalization - A procedure rendering plants or plant products incapable of germination, growth or further reproduction [ICPM, 2001]

eradication Application of phytosanitary measures to eliminate a pest from an area [FAO, 1990; revised FAO, 1995; formerly eradicate]

inspection - Official visual examination of plants, plant products or other regulated articles to determine if pests are present and/or to determine compliance with phytosanitary regulations [FAO, 1990; revised FAO, 1995; formerly inspect]

intermediate quarantine - Quarantine in a country other than the country of origin or destination [CEPM, 1996]

pathway - Any means that allows the entry or spread of a pest [FAO, 1990; revised FAO, 1995]

Pest Free Area - An area in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained [FAO, 1995]

Pest Risk Analysis - The process of evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether an organism is a pest, whether it should be regulated, and the strength of any phytosanitary measures to be taken against it [FAO, 1995; revised IPPC, 1997; ISPM No. 2, 2007]

phytosanitary import requirements - Specific phytosanitary measures established by an importing country concerning consignments moving into that country [ICPM, 2005]

phytosanitary procedure - Any official method for implementing phytosanitary measures including the performance of inspections, tests, surveillance or treatments in connection with regulated pests [FAO, 1990; revised FAO, 1995; CEPM, 1999; ICPM, 2001; ICPM, 2005]

point of entry - Airport, seaport or land border point officially designated for the importation of consignments, and/or entrance of passengers [FAO, 1995]

surveillance - An official process which collects and records data on pest occurrence or absence by survey, monitoring or other procedures [CEPM, 1996]

treatment - Official procedure for the killing, inactivation or removal of pests, or for rendering pests infertile or for devitalization [FAO, 1990, revised FAO, 1995; ISPM No.15, 2002; ISPM No.18, 2003; ICPM, 2005]

Outline of requirements

Guidelines for the protection of APPPC rubber growing countries against SALB, based on the 2007 *Pest risk analysis for South American leaf blight (SALB) of rubber (Hevea)*, are proposed by considering five major areas:

- the prevention of the introduction of SALB into Asia and Pacific region using import requirements, and systems for points of entry inspections, laboratory diagnostics, and surveillance
- the establishment of eradication or control programmes in case of entry of SALB;
- the development of training programmes on inspection and diagnostic methods, surveillance, eradication and control programmes;
- the minimum resources, in terms of for personnel and facilities, for protection against SALB
- the establishment of coordination and cooperation activities for SALB programmes.

Systems for preventing the introduction of SALB include the establishment of import requirements for host material (including budded stumps and bud wood, seeds, *in vitro* plants and foliage) and non-host material (inanimate goods or non-host organic material, travellers from SALB endemic countries and other items). Risk management can include measures such as inspection for freedom from infection; surface sterilisation and post-entry quarantine for plants for planting; seed treatment for seeds; and removal, destruction or heat treatment for contamination of non-viable host material. The operational structures supporting the

prevention of the introduction of SALB include points of entry inspection systems, a laboratory diagnostic system and SALB surveillance systems.

Rubber growing countries should also, within their SALB protection programme, develop and establish contingency plans for eradication or control programmes in case the disease is found in a country. Training programmes for inspection, diagnostic and disinfection procedures, surveillance, eradication and control measures, and staff management need to be developed. A minimum resource level of personnel and facilities should be established for SALB protection programmes.

In managing a national SALB protection programme, NPPOs should ensure that a centralised committee is set up to coordinate activities and that appropriate links are made with other related bodies to exchange information. For a regional coordination programme, the commission may consider establishing an SALB cooperation committee, the activities of which could be supported by all member countries.

Background

The South American leaf blight (SALB) is caused by the fungus *Microcyclus ulei* (P.Henn) v. Arx and is the most destructive disease of rubber. It has been a major constraint in the production of rubber in South America. The disease could also cause great economic damage to the rubber growing countries of Asia and the Pacific region if it were to be introduced into the area. This was recognised by countries of the region when establishing the Plant Protection Agreement for the Asia and Pacific region (the Agreement) in 1956, with the promulgation of Article IV and Appendix B to the Agreement which dealt specifically with SALB. This obliged members to prohibit the import of: plants or seed of the genus *Hevea* from outside the region; plant material of genus *Hevea* not capable of further growth or propagation (such as fresh or dried herbarium specimens); and any plants of other than genus *Hevea* from SALB endemic areas into their countries unless certain stringent phytosanitary import requirements were met.

When revising the Agreement in 1999 to bring it in line with the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the 1956 provisions relating to SALB were found to be inconsistent. APPPC decided that a pest risk analysis (PRA) on SALB should be developed by APPPC member countries.

The PRA for SALB was completed and accepted by the 25th Session of the APPPC in August 2007 (subsequently referred to as the SALB PRA). The PRA is the guideline used to develop this standard on SALB.

Purpose

This standard provides guidelines for APPPC member countries that grow rubber to prevent the entry, spread and establishment of SALB, taking into account the SALB PRA.

The guidelines cover five major areas:

- the prevention of the introduction of SALB into Asia and Pacific region using import requirements, and systems for points of entry inspections, laboratory diagnostics, and surveillance

- the establishment of eradication or control programmes in case of entry of SALB;
- the development of training programmes on inspection and diagnostic methods, surveillance, eradication and control programmes;
- the minimum resources, in terms of for personnel and facilities, for protection against SALB
- the establishment of coordination and cooperation activities for SALB programmes.

REQUIREMENTS

1. The prevention of the introduction of SALB

The prevention of the introduction of SALB into rubber growing countries can be achieved by an integrated programme including:

- strict phytosanitary import requirements (enabled through legislation) that reduce any potential risk from imports to a level acceptable to the importing country
- an inspection system at points of entry that ensures compliance with import requirements
- a laboratory diagnostic system for the identification of the pathogen
- an efficient surveillance system that ensures early detection of the pest.

1.1 Import requirements

Import requirements should be determined based on the SALB PRA which describes the pathways of entry and the relative risks of those pathways taking into account consequences and the appropriate level of protection of the individual country.

The SALB PRA noted the pathways for the entry of the pathogen as:

- Budded stumps and budwood
- foliage (stem and leaf material not for planting)
- flowers, fruit and seeds
- plants *in vitro*
- rubber wood
- travellers
- inanimate goods or non-host organic material (contaminated by spores)
- inanimate goods or non-host organic material contaminated by host plant material

Appendix 1 is a summary of the assessments of introduction, spread and consequences from the SALB PRA.

The NPPO of each rubber growing member country should consider import requirements as follows:

1.1.1 Host material (*Hevea* spp.)

As identified in the SALB PRA, planting material of *Hevea* from SALB endemic countries (see Appendix 2) is categorised as high risk. Importing countries should apply measures as

necessary. Rubber growing countries should consider limiting the entry of high risk material to designated entry points. Measures are described in the SALB PRA and include the following.

For budded stumps and bud wood*:

- prohibition of imports if an importing country does not have the capacity to apply effective measures to mitigate risk to an appropriate level of protection
- restriction of quantity based on the capacity of the pose-entry quarantine (PEQ) station
- restricting the length of each budwood stick to less than 1 metre
- pre-export inspection and treatment
- measures applied on arrival (in an appropriately secure facility)
- restriction of imports to Government Research Institutes only and using PEQ stations
- other PEQ facilities or intermediate quarantine for at least one year and certified free from SALB by a SALB expert.

For seeds:

- restrictions on the quantities of seed imported
- only healthy seeds should be imported
- washing with a surface sterilant and dressing with a fungicide immediately prior to export.

For *in vitro* plants:

- growing the plants aseptically on agar for more than three months followed by appropriate inspection or testing.

For foliage:

- the prohibition of foliage of *Hevea* from SALB countries unless treated to remove the risk.

1.1.2 Non-host material (SALB endemic countries)

Non host material includes travellers, inanimate goods and non-host organic material.

Travellers from SALB endemic countries

Where a rubber growing country has determined a level of risk associated with travellers from SALB endemic countries, the travellers should be required to make a declaration to the NPPO point of entry inspector if they have visited a SALB endemic country in the last 21 days and have visited a rubber plantation. Special care should be taken with such items such as camping equipment and hiking boots, farm equipment and decorative plant material as these are more likely to contain non-viable host material greater than 1 cm² that may be contaminated with SALB. Measures to remove possible contamination may include cleaning, disinfection or destruction.

Inanimate goods

Cargo such as machinery that has been used in rubber plantations as well as household effects (gardening tools/equipment) in SALB endemic countries may be contaminated with non-viable host material carrying the pathogen. Measures include steam cleaning to remove all organic material which should be destroyed. Machinery should be dismantled if necessary. Where suspect material cannot be removed or the material cannot be destroyed (eg herbarium

*budded stumps includes seedling stumps

material) the material should be heat treated for a minimum of 30 minutes at 56°C or a level that achieves the importing countries appropriate level of protection.

Non-host organic material

Other items, such as planting material and foliage, of non-SALB hosts may need to be assessed for possible SALB contamination and phytosanitary procedures and appropriate treatment applied.

1.1.3 Risk management methods

A number of risk management methods from section 4 of the SALB PRA are given in Appendix 3.

1.2 Points of entry inspection systems

When determined necessary, consignments from SALB endemic countries, including traveller's hand-carried items, should be subjected to inspection by NPPO inspectors at points of entry.

Points of entry inspection systems should be such to ensure that consignments and travellers comply with import/entry requirements.

NPPOs should follow the general guidelines provided in ISPM No. 23: *Guidelines for inspection*.

Specific points relating to inspection for risk items concerning SALB include:

- examination of documents associated with consignments to ensure that all permitted planting material has the correct certification
- examination of manifests to identify inanimate goods or non-host organic material that might be contaminated with the spores of the pathogen or host material that need to be inspected
- trained personnel to be stationed at entry points to recognize live and dead plant material of *Hevea*
- inspection of consignments, including used machinery, that have been in the rubber plantations of SALB infected countries
- equipment and chemicals for disinfection and disposing of any suspect material or non compliance consignment should be available to inspectors
- to ensure appropriate security, systems for packing and transporting suspect material to diagnostic laboratories should be available
- phytosanitary action, as noted in ISPM No. 20 *Guidelines for an import a phytosanitary import regulatory system*, section 5.1.6.1), should be taken where non-compliance occurs or SALB is detected.

1.3 Laboratory diagnostic system

Countries should have, or have access to, appropriate laboratory diagnostic tools. This may include the following:

- diagnostic facilities for the identification of suspect fungal isolates. These laboratories should be established at or near the designated entry points where possible.
- the laboratories should follow standard procedures for the diagnosis of the pathogen(s) on specimens.

1.4 SALB surveillance systems

NPPOs in rubber growing countries should establish and maintain national systems for surveillance for SALB – see ISPM No. 6. It is essential that any incursion of the pathogen is detected before it establishes and becomes widespread.

Additional surveillance programmes may be implemented in countries if the disease occurs in neighbouring country or is intercepted at an entry point. Such surveillance systems would be ongoing. Specific surveillance systems are described in Appendix 4.

2. Eradication or control programmes

To be prepared in the event that the disease is found in a country, the NPPOs of APPPC rubber growing countries should develop and establish contingency plans for eradication or control programmes according to ISPM No. 9 *Guidelines for pest eradication programmes*. The plans should include a system for preventing the movement of potentially infected or contaminated materials within and out of infected areas. Such plans could include the following components:

Operational procedures

- undertaking of a delimiting survey of the affected area
- undertaking other surveys as necessary
- documenting records of occurrences
- international notification
- carrying out an eradication feasibility study
- establishing and undertaking the eradication programme or control measures including surveillance, containment, treatment /
- disinfection and destruction procedures
- systems for the prevention of the movement of possibly infected or contaminated material within and out of infected areas
- verification of eradication.

Required resources

- a means of identifying the disease in the field plus a diagnostic laboratory support for confirmation of identifications
- identification of appropriate eradication methodologies
- administrative systems including a management structure and documentation procedures
- trained operational staff
- regulations providing authority for procedure implementation (movement prohibitions, setting up check-points, etc)
- information management system
- communications programme, including media, public awareness
- financial support.

3. Training programmes

NPPOs of rubber growing countries should establish training programmes for the staff on inspection, diagnostic and disinfection procedures; surveillance; eradication and control measures; and management of programmes for SALB. The components of such programmes are listed below:

3.1 Inspection, diagnostic and disinfection procedures

- procedures of inspection
- procedures of clearance
- inspection of document and import requirements
- recognizing the symptoms of SALB and its pathogen
- recognizing host plants and host plant parts
- laboratory diagnostic protocols and procedures for identification of the pathogen
- disinfection or destruction of infected or non-compliant materials
- disinfection procedures for personnel handling diseased material.

3.2 Surveillance programmes

- early detection systems
- identification of symptoms and the pathogen
- surveillance procedures and sampling techniques
- documentation and reporting.

3.3 Eradication and control measures

- knowledge on eradication and control procedures
- safe handling of chemicals and equipment
- use of a geographical information system to map affected areas
- application of fungicides
- eradication programmes (including simulated outbreak exercises).

3.4 Management of programmes

- eradication programme management
- programme documentation and recording
- communication with growers, industry representatives government departments, NGOs and public
- communications/media.

4. Minimum requirements for personnel and facilities

The NPPO of each rubber growing country should have as a minimum resource for protection against SALB:

- designated expert(s) on SALB
- trained inspectors for consignment inspection and for surveillance programmes
- diagnostic capabilities to detect and identify the pathogen
- PEQ facilities
- access to aerial spraying organisations or companies
- disinfection facilities including:
 - o dipping tank with sodium hypochlorite
 - o hot water jet system for disinfection
 - o incinerator
 - o UV Chamber
 - o access to chemicals and any necessary registration for use

5. National and regional coordination and cooperation

5.1 National

The NPPO of each rubber growing country should coordinate the activities of the SALB programme or, where appropriate, establish a centralised body or committee (if one does not already exist) to do this. The activities of such a body or committee could cover the following areas:

- resource management
- programme documentation, evaluation and improvement procedures
- centralised communication with growers, industry representatives, government departments and NGOs
- establishment and maintenance of a national focal point
- surveillance planning
- public awareness initiatives and programmes.

5.2 Regional

The NPPO or the committee would also establish links with related bodies or committees in other rubber growing countries to exchange information and establish regional programmes where necessary to:

- seek technical assistance
- seek financial assistance
- ensure availability of technical expertise through regular regional and international workshops, training and seminars on SALB
- provide training on SALB
- cooperate with other regional and international organizations that deal with rubber and with the NPPOs of non-rubber growing countries (that could, for example, supply opportunities for intermediate quarantine, undertaking research)
- cooperate with SALB endemic countries in training, research, the safe transfer of rubber plant germplasm including the verification of phytosanitary systems and information exchange.

The Commission may consider the establishment of an SALB Cooperation Committee to oversee and coordinate various regional activities for the prevention of the introduction of SALB into the region. The NPPOs of all member countries should support regional activities for the prevention of the entry of the disease into the area where this is appropriate.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Table 1 Summary of the assessments of introduction, spread and consequences to rubber growing countries (source SALB PRA, 2007 Table 6)

Vector	Probability of Entry	Probability of Establishment	Probability of Spread	Likely Impact	Level of Risk
Host material (<i>Hevea</i> species)					
Budded stumps or budwood	High	High	High	High	High
Foliage (stem and leaf material not for planting)	Low	High	High	High	Moderate
Flowers, fruit and seeds	Low	High	High	High	Low
Plants <i>in-vitro</i>	Negligible	N/A	N/A	N/A	Negligible
Non-host material					
Inanimate goods or non-host organic material	Negligible	N/A	N/A	N/A	Negligible
Inanimate goods or non-host organic material contaminated by host plant material	Low (if < 1cm ²)	High	High	High	Low (if < 1cm ²)

SALB Endemic Countries

(source SALB PRA, 2007 Plate 5)

1. Belize
2. Bolivia
3. Brazil
4. Colombia
5. Costa Rica
6. Dominican Republic
7. Ecuador
8. El Salvador
9. French Guiana
10. Guatemala
11. Guyana
12. Haiti
13. Honduras
14. Mexico
15. Nicaragua
16. Panama
17. Paraguay
18. Peru
19. Surinam
20. Trinidad & Tobago
21. Venezuela

Risk management methods for SALB (Source SALB PRA, 2007 Section 4)

This is a direct copy of the relevant section of the SALB PRA (with the reference to ISPM No. 5 being updated). The section numbers are changed to fit this appendix. References are to be found in the SALB PRA.

RISK MANAGEMENT

The guiding principle for risk management should be to manage risk to achieve the required degree of safety that can be justified and is feasible within the limits of available options and resources. Pest risk management (in the analytical sense) is the process of identifying ways to react to a perceived risk, evaluating the efficacy of these actions, and identifying the most appropriate options (ISPM 11 2004). The effectiveness of any risk management measures depends on our perception and understanding of the disease and the risk pathways. Phytosanitary measures drawn up on the basis of science and practicality are essentially easy to implement, have minimal economic impact and are discriminating.

Based on the assessment of risks completed in the previous chapters of this risk analysis, risk commodities have been divided into the following groups.

1. Viable host material:
 - 1.1 Plants for planting: Whole plants and cuttings, and plants in-vitro;
 - 1.2 Seeds, flowers and fruit.

2. Non-viable (inanimate) host material:
 - 2.1 Cargo pathway (including sea freight, airfreight and mail);
 - 2.2 Passenger pathway (including accompanied luggage).

For goods or passengers originating from an area not known to be free of SALB, the following risk management measures may be applied.

1. Management options for viable host material

Viable host material includes any plant parts that are being imported into the region for the purposes of propagation or could be propagated by conventional means.

1.1 Plants for planting

The IPPC definition of plants for planting includes whole plants and cuttings, and plants *in-vitro* (ISPM 5 2009). For the purposes of this risk analysis only budded stumps and budwood have been considered for measures as they are the most likely form to be transported between countries for planting.

1.1.1 Budded stumps and budwood

Management of the phytosanitary risks associated with the import of budded stumps and budwood for propagation should start in the country of origin. Efforts should be made to

ensure that, as far as is reasonable and possible, budded stumps and budwood exported to the PRA area should be free of SALB. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ): *Postentry Quarantine Manual for State Inspectors* (2006) states that to achieve an appropriate level of assurance from plant inspections, plants should be inspected over two growing seasons. It is therefore considered appropriate that mother plants of budded stumps and budwood should undergo periods pre-export and post entry inspection for signs of SALB before being distributed in the PRA area.

In the case of SALB and the susceptible *Hevea* species, the period of greatest disease expression is at the time of new foliage growth. Therefore budded stumps and budwood should only be harvested from mother plants that have been recently inspected during a period of optimal disease expression and no signs of SALB were detected. To further lessen the likelihood of contamination, harvesting of budded stumps and budwood should only occur when the bark has been hardened (brown in colour) and during the low-disease season (e.g. dry weather). Budded stumps and budwood should be no longer than 1 metre when exported, and the material dipped into a suitable surface sterilant followed by a suitable systemic fungicide. All packaging material should be destroyed on arrival in the PRA area.

During the post-entry quarantine inspection period plants should be maintained in an environment that both stimulates SALB expression and limits the ability of SALB to escape the facility and infect surrounding host plants. No fungicides effective against SALB should therefore be applied to plants during the inspection period (new leaf growth) as fungicides may mask disease expression. SALB containment can be achieved either through the use of high security quarantine facilities or by ensuring no host plants are within 3 km of the boundaries of the facility. To ensure any infected plants are removed from the post-entry quarantine facility as possible, plants should be inspected daily by staff trained to detect signs of SALB infection. Suitably qualified plant pathologists should also inspect the plants every two weeks to verify the daily inspections by facility staff.

If SALB is positively identified in the quarantine facility, all host plants in the facility should be treated with an appropriate fungicide, and another inspection period instigated.

Based on the aforementioned recommendations, the following measures should be applied to budded stumps and budwood before export from the SALB affected country or region, during transport to the PRA area, and on arrival in the PRA area.

Pre-export inspection and treatment

- Mother plants should be inspected by suitably qualified plant pathologist for signs of SALB infection and deemed to be free of SALB infection. Inspections should take place immediately before the harvesting of budded stumps or budwood and during a period considered optimal for disease expression;
- Harvesting of budded stumps and budwood should only occur when the bark has been hardened (brown in colour) and during the low-disease season (e.g. dry weather). Budded stumps and budwood should be no longer than 1 metre when exported;
- Budded stumps and budwood should be packaged for export in a manner that limits the likelihood of infestation during transport.
- Budded stumps and budwood should be dipped in an appropriate surface sterilant and a systemic fungicide effective against *M. ulei*;

- Budded stumps should be free from soil.

Measures on arrival (in an appropriately secure facility)

- Budded stumps and budwood should be dipped in an appropriate surface sterilant and a systemic fungicide effective against *M. ulei*;
- All packaging material should be destroyed or appropriately sterilised, and the budded stumps and budwood repackaged after treatment.

Post entry quarantine

- Imported budded stumps and budwood should be grown in a suitable post entry quarantine facility for at least one year or after new foliage has been produced at least six times;
- Plants should be inspected for signs of SALB daily by suitable trained facility staff and fortnightly by suitably qualified plant pathologists;
- Should any signs of SALB be detected, plants showing signs should be destroyed and all other *Hevea* plants within the facility should be treated with suitable fungicide (treatment may require six or more applications);
- Prior to release from the facility all plants in the facility should be inspected by a suitable qualified plant pathologist for signs of SALB infection;
- Plants may be released from the post entry quarantine facility only after having all plants in the facility have been free from any signs of SALB for at least one year or after new foliage has been produced at least six times.

Intermediate quarantine

Intermediate quarantine offers a further option to mitigate risk. This system can have some logistical, maintenance and financial problems when used for rubber, but it may operate successfully in some specific circumstances.

1.1.2 Plants *in vitro*

Plants *in vitro* should not be considered a risk pathway for the entry of *M. ulei* if the cultures are axenic. However, at the moment the practice is not commercially used.

1.2 Seeds and fruit

As the risk from seeds and fruit material relates to surface contamination only, all such products exported from SALB regions should be surface sterilised immediately prior to export.

Flowers and fruits should be washed with a surface sterilant such as 200 ppm of sodium hypochlorite (Chee 2006). Only healthy seeds should be selected for export, washed with water and soaked in formalin (5%) for 15 minutes, and then air dried and dressed with thiophanate methyl, benomyl or mancozeb (Chee 1978; Santos and Pereira 1986).

2. Management options for non-viable host material

Non-viable host material is essentially leaves or other parts of a host plant (susceptible *Hevea* species) that are imported either deliberately or as contaminants into the PRA area from countries or areas not known to be free of SALB. These types of host material are not able to be propagated by normal means.

2.1 Cargo pathway

Cargo from SALB infested countries or areas should be screened for goods or shipments that are likely to contain or be contaminated by non-viable host material. A profile list should be established that identifies cargo most at risk of containing non-viable host material.

Cargo such as used machinery (cars, logging equipment, chainsaws, cutters etc) that may have been used in rubber plantations should be thoroughly steam cleaned of all organic material larger than 1 cm², and dismantled if there are parts that can not be easily cleaned. Household effects should be inspected for gardening equipment that may be contaminated by organic material.

Any organic material that is thought to be from a susceptible *Hevea* species, is larger than 1 cm², and can not be removed from the goods or can not be destroyed (e.g. herbarium material), should be heat treated for a minimum of 30 continuous minutes at 56°C or greater.

2.2 Passenger pathway

Passengers and accompanied luggage arriving within 21 days from areas not known to be free of SALB should be inspected for both viable and non-viable host material. Special care should be taken with such items as camping equipment and hiking boots, farm equipment, and decorative plant material as these are more likely to contain or be contaminated by non-viable host material greater than 1 cm². Measures may include cleaning, disinfection or destruction.

3. Residual risk after measures

While the measures above, if strictly and effectively enforced, should be expected to manage the phytosanitary risks posed by SALB to the PRA area, it should still be considered possible that slippage (undetected risk items) may result in the establishment of SALB in the region. Efforts should be made to manage this residual risk by establishing an effective monitoring system that would be expected to detect an establishment event early enough to allow for an effective eradication programme to be completed.

SALB surveillance system

1. Responsibilities of the Survey and Monitoring Officer

- Plan surveys and monitoring programmes
- Produce format and guidelines on survey procedures
- Identify agencies and persons to implement surveys
- Monitor, coordinate and direct all survey
- Report immediately the event of detection of SALB or any other disease and pests not hitherto found
- Assist in the identification of SALB

2. Types of surveillance

There are several types of survey each conducted for different purposes as outlined in ISPM No. 6 *Guidelines for surveillance*.. These may include: initial detection surveys, delimiting surveys, monitoring or evaluation surveys and nation-wide surveys.

2.1 Detection Survey

The initial detection surveys will be conducted to determine if the disease is present for the first time. A detection survey should include the following components:

2.1.1.1 Areas

Areas that should be inspected include rubber estates, smallholdings and nurseries which are likely to be exposed to:

- travellers and air carriers
- planting materials from SALB endemic areas.

2.1.1.2 Coverage

- points of entry, parcel/post office, tourist routes,
Any rubber trees found within 2 km from the site
- Rubber estate, small holding and Rubber Research Institute
All rubber tree growing areas within a plantation/institute.

2.1.1.3 Sampling Procedure

All trees in the nurseries should be inspected. For mature plantings, the numbers of sampling point is one (1) every 5 hectares.

2.1.1.4 Survey Frequency

The survey in the nurseries should be carried out monthly during the wet season and fortnightly on mature stands during refoliation irrespective of weather.

2.2 Farmer-based Detection Survey

For rubber growing areas (small holders or plantation-owned), a detection survey must be farmer-based. The owners of these estates or smallholdings shall be provided with leaflets biennially informing them to be vigilant for SALB and to report immediately to the Survey and Monitoring Officer in the event of any suspected presence of SALB in their respective holdings. This instructional and informative leaflet should be prepared and distributed by the Survey and Monitoring Coordinator for dissemination to all estates and smallholders.

2.3 Delimiting Surveys

When an infection of SALB is suspected or detected in an area, a delimiting survey should be conducted immediately to determine the extent of the infection. This involves inspection (as outlined under the Sampling Procedure, section 2.1.1.3) of all the surrounding fields starting from the centre of the infected area and extending to a radius of 5 km (beyond the affected areas)

2.4 Monitoring/ Evaluation Surveys

The purpose of the monitoring and evaluation surveys is to monitor the effectiveness of the eradication measures that have been carried out and to establish whether the disease has been contained, eradicated or has spread to other areas surrounding the infested zone. Hence monitoring and evaluation surveys will have to be conducted once the eradication procedures have been initiated. They need to continue until eradication is declared or until it is determined that eradication is not possible. If the incursion is contained, ongoing monitoring surveys will be necessary.

2.5 Nation-wide survey

In the case of a detection of SALB, a nation-wide survey should be conducted to determine if the disease has spread or an incursion has occurred in other part of the country. The results may initiate emergency measures to be implemented by other countries.

3. Reporting of surveys

After completion of each survey round, the report from each survey should be submitted immediately to the coordinator. Any suspected detection of SALB should be notified to the NPPO immediately.